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Abstract
Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound
transportation operations to 3PL service providers. The resulting increase in the number of actors often leads
to sub-optimal supply chain actions due to the antagonistic nature of the economic objectives of the partners.
With the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal system performance in such supply chains,
this study analyzes the contractual relation between a retailer and a 3PL service provider using game theoretical
approaches.
The partners of the studied supply chain play a Stackelberg game in which the retailer is the leader and the
carrier is the follower. The retailer faces an uncertain demand and needs to supply his store from his warehouse.
He has the option of not meeting all the demand but must satisfy at least a minimum percentage of the final
demand. On the other hand, the carrier has to determine the number of trucks needed to satisfy this demand
before uncertainty is resolved. Once demand is realized, if the reserved transportation capacity is insufficient,
the carrier also has the possibility to requisition trucks at a higher price.
The contract that is proposed with the aim of increaseing the efficiency of the supply chain has two para-
meters : the quantity of transported items and the number of trucks used. In our settings, the retailer is the
one that submits the contract and the carrier decides if he accepts it or not. We compare this situation with a
centralized model where a single decision maker takes all the decisions.
1. Introduction
In today’s competitive markets, firms tend to outsource their non-core operations in order to improve their
responsiveness to market changes and to maximise their profits. This behavior increases the number of decision-
makers in the supply chain and often leads to sub-optimal supply chain actions. Therefore, one would like to
design contracts that commits each member of the supply chain to behave with the aim to increase the efficiency
of the whole supply chain while preserving the interests of each party. The aim of this paper is to analyze the
contractual relation between a retailer and its supplier.
To study this situation, we analyze a general outsourcing system in which a retailer facing an uncertain
demand needs to supply his store. He has the option of not meeting all the demand but must satisfy at least
a minimum proportion of the final demand. The retailer outsources his production activities to a supplier by
submitting a contract. The proposed contract is composed of two terms (a, p) where a is the amount paid by the
distributor per unit of capacity installed at the carrier and p is the price paid per delivered item. The aim here
is to find the optimal operating policies of each player that maximizes his outcome and analyze if the supply
chain is coordinated with this arrengement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A review of the relevant litterature is presented in Section
2. We develop the model and hypothesis in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze the ideal case of a centralized
system. The Stackelberg game is considered in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide an algorithm to find the
optimal solution of the Stackelberg game and conduct numerical analysis. Section 7 presents some concluding
remarks.
2. Literature review
This paper is related in varying degrees to several research stream in the operations management literature.
The situation analyzed combines a newsvendor problem, a capacity game and a contract negotiation. Each of
these streams is well studied in the literature and we consider them as equally important in this study.
This paper study a system related to the newsvendor problem. Various extensions of this problem have been
studied. For a classification of these extensions, see the literature reviews by Khouja [Kho99] and Qin [QWV+11].
In our situation, the carrier faces a newsvendor problem with recourse : the transportation capacity can be
increased after the real demand is known. Fisher and Raman [FR96] study a related problem where a seller may
submit a second order at a given time during the selling period. This second order is limited in its quantity and
is used to satisfy the backordered demand of the first sub-period and some part of the unknown demand of the
second sub-period. A similar environnement is considered in Lau and Lau ([LL97b] and [LL97a]). They consider
the same model as Fisher and Raman whithout the capacity constraint on the second order but with lead-times
between the order and the reception of the goods. To our knowledge, the system studied by Khouja [Kho96]
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is the closest from the one considered in this study. In this system, the newsvendor can order additional items
from an emergency supply at a higher cost once the demand is known. Still, all these problems differs from
the one faced by our carrier. In our case, even if the emergency option is costly, the carrier may have to
increase its capacity after the demand is known. In the paper cited precedingly, if the emergency option costs
more than to backorder or to loose the sales, the problem is reduced to a classical newsvendor problem. Other
types of newsvendor problem with recourse are also studied in Kouvelis and Milner [KM02] and Gallego and
Moon [GM93].
Newsvendor problems concerns situation with one decision maker. There are two in the system studied in
this paper. As a consequence, the newsvendor problem has to be widened to a capacity game. A capacity game
modelizes the arrengement between two level of the same supply chain to assure supply to one of the party.
Closely related to our research is the work by Cachon and Larivie`re [CL01]. They study a system where a
manufacturer proposes a contract to an upstream supplier to install some capacity. They consider two settings :
forced and voluntary compliance. Under forced compliance, the supplier is obliged to satisfy the manufacturer’s
maximum order and has to set its capacity accordingly. While, under voluntary compliance, the supplier may
decide of its capacity freely. We consider a hybrid system where our carrier may choose its capacity freely at
first but finaly is obligated to satisfy a minimum proportion of the retailer’s demand. The major difference
between the system of Cachon and Larivie`re and ours is in the abilities given to each player. In Cachon and
Larivie`re, the leader may retain some information. As a consequence, the leader gains more power and is able to
use it to increase its profits. While in our case, the follower is able to adjusts its decisions once the uncertainty
is resolved. This makes the bargain decisions harder for the leader and induce greater expected profits for the
follower. Other types of capacity games are described in Cachon and Larivie`re [CL99], for distribution chains,
Wang and Gerchak [WG03], for assembly chains, and in Serel [Ser07], who considers uncertainty in the supply
too.
This paper is also closely related to the literature on supply chain coordination with contracts and supply
chain contract negotiation. Different types of contracts have been studied in the literature. The one that we
propose is common in today’s firm interactions but has received poor interest in the scientific research. Ca-
chon [Cac03] gives a good survey on supply chain coordination with contracts. Cachon and Larivie`re [CL05]
demonstrate that revenue sharing contract can coordinate a two-echelon supply chain with a price-setting
newsvendor. Zhao et al. [ZWC+10] consider a two-level supply chain with a stochastic demand and show that
coordination may be achieved using option contracts. Taylor [Tay05] studies sales-rebate contract with sales
effort effects. He shows that when demand is affected by the retailer’s sales effort, a target rebate contract
and a returns contract can achieve channel coordination. Other contracts types that have been studied in the
literature include quantity discounts (Weng [Wen95]) and quantity-fexibility contracts (Tsay [Tsa99]).
3.Model Description
This article consider an outsourcing problem in a two-level supply chain with a retailer and a supplier. The
retailer, R, sells a certain item on the market and faces a stochastic demand for this item. The supplier, S, has
to decide of the capacity dedicated to the retailer’s demand. The problem is to determine the total capacity
that will be reserved before the uncertainty is resolved.
The demand is denoted by a random variable X where f(x) is the distribution function and F (x) is the
cumulative distribution function. It is assumed that F (x) = 0 for all x ≤ 0. Shortages are allowed but the
retailer is obligated to satisfy a minimum proportion of the final demand, u, which is determined exogeneously.
Different costs are incured during the process. First, the supplier pays a fixed quantity c1 for each unit of
capacity reserved before uncertainty is resolved. Once demand is realized, if the actual capacity is insufficient,
the supplier has the opportunity to requisition additional units of capacity from an emergency option at a
higher price c2 > c1. Finally, each item produced incurs a processing cost r and is sold at the price of s. It is
assumed that the selling price is greater than the minimum distribution costs, i.e s > r + c1, otherwhise it is
not profitable to sell this item.
In order to ensure a minimum service level, the retailer submits a contract to the supplier. This contract
is composed of two terms (a, p) where a is the amount paid by the retailer per unit of capacity reserved or
requisitionned by the supplier and p is the price paid per item transported. Note that this contract is a buy-
back contract : the retailer buys each unit of capacity at a price of a + p and receives a partial credit equal
to p for each unused unit of capacity. This contract has two advantages. First, it is a simple contract, easy to
implement and based on the performance of the supplier. Second, it include different types of contracts. If a =
0, then it is a wholesale-price contract. While if p = 0, then it is a capacity contract. These two simple contracts
has strenght and weakness. For example, in the case of a capacity contract, the supplier will generally build
a very high capacity which reduces the shortages. This behavior is the optimal for the supplier but is clearly
not for the retailer. This is also why we design the contract such that a is a compensation per unit of capacity
installed, a < c1. Consequently, p has to be greater than r. We suppose that the supplier accepts a contract
only if his expected profit is nonnegative under the application of this contract.
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During the game, the following sequence of events occurs : before demand is realised, the retailer proposes
the contract to the supplier ; if the supplier accepts this contract, he decides how many trucks he reserves. Once
the demand is known, the supplier decides to requisition additional trucks or not and satisfy the totality or a
fraction of demand following the contract specifications.
Finally, the problem faced by each member of the supply chain is the following. The supplier has a two-
stage problem. In the first stage, when demand is still uncertain, he has to decide the capacity reserved, Y . In
the second stage, when the demand x is known, he decides the additional capacity requisitionned, Z, and the
quantity that he delivers, Q. He also has some constraints. He must at least satisfy a minimum proportion of
the demand, u ≤ 1, but he cannot deliver more than the demanded amount. We suppose that all the decision
variables Y , Z, and Q are continuous. The retailer’s profit depends on the quantity delivered, Q, and on the
total capacity installed, Y + Z. All the cited variables are decision variables of the supplier. The only decision
variables of the retailer are the contract parameters, a and p.
The supplier’s profit, ΠS is a function of the contract parameters a and p and is modelized as follows :
ΠS(a, p) = maxEx [pi(x)]− c1.Y
s.t Y ≥ 0
where
pi(x) = max a.(Y + Z)− c2.Z + (p− r).Q
s.t Q ≤ Y + Z (1)
Q ≥ u.x (2)
Q ≤ x (3)
Q,Z,≥ 0
The quantity ΠS(a, p) is the supplier’s gain under the contract (a, p). Constraint (1) ensures that the quantity
delivered does not exceed the total capacity build. Constraint (2) defines the minimum service level. Finally,
constraint (3) limits the quantity delivered to be at most equal to the demand.
The optimization problem of the retailer is the following :
ΠR = maxEx [(s− p).Q∗(a, p, x)− a.(Y ∗(a, p) + Z∗(a, p, x))]
s.t ΠS(a, p) ≥ 0 (4)
a, p ≥ 0
where the functions Y ∗(a, p), Z∗(a, p, x), and Q∗(a, p, x) are the optimal values of the variables Y , Z, and Q
in the supplier’s problem under a contract with (a, p) as parameters and facing a demand x. In problem ΠR, the
decision variables are a and p and the retailer’s profit is a function of the demand satisfied minus the contract
costs. Constraint (4) ensures that the supplier will accept the contract only if he obtains a nonnegative profit.
4. Centralized System
In this section, we develop the optimal solution when the supply chain is centralized, i.e, when a centralized
decision maker takes all the decisions and incures all the costs. We will use the solution obtained as a benchmark
for our developments. The problem considered is a two-stage problem. In the first stage, while demand is still
uncertain, the decision maker builds a capacity Y . In the second stage, when demand is known, he requisitions
additional capacity, Z, and satisfies a part of the demand, Q. Therefore, the model is the following :
Πcent = max Ex [picent(x)]− c1.Y
s.t Y ≥ 0
where
picent(x) = max(s− r)Q− c2.Z
s.t Q ≤ Y + Z (5)
Q ≥ u.x (6)
Q ≤ x (7)
Q,Z ≥ 0
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We need a closed form result for the expectation of picent to be able to calculate the objective function of the
first stage. The following theorem gives the optimal value of the second stage variables Q, and Z.
Proposition 1
For fixed values of Y and x, we have the following :
1. if s ≥ c2 + r then
– if x ≤ Y then Q∗ = x, and Z∗ = 0.
– if x > Y then Q∗ = x, and Z∗ = x− Y .
2. if s < c2 + r then
– if x ≤ Y then Q∗ = x, and Z∗ = 0.
– if u.x ≤ Y < x then Q∗ = Y , and Z∗ = 0.
– if u.x > Y then Q∗ = u.x, and Z∗ = u.x− Y .
where Q∗, and Z∗ are the optimal second stage decisions.
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendices. From this proposition, we are able to derive the follo-
wing theorem.
Theorem 1
In the centralized system, the optimal first stage decision Y ∗ is :
1. if s ≥ c2 + r,




2. if s < c2 + r, the solution of the following equation :




Using Theorem 1, we are able to compute the optimal first stage decision Y and the total profit of the
centralized system.
5. Stackelberg Game
In this section, we consider that each member of the supply chain aims to maximize his own profit and do not
consider the other party’s objectives. This gives rises to a Stackelberg game where the retailer is the leader. As
the leader, he can anticipate the supplier’s decisions. If he is able to compute the supplier’s optimal response to
a contract (a, p), then he can use this knowledge to find the optimal parameters a∗ and p∗ that will maximize
his profit. To compute the supplier’s response function, we need to calculate the expectation of the second stage
objective function of the model ΠS for fixed values of a, p and Y .
Proposition 2
For fixed values of a, p and Y , the supplier’s optimal solution of the second stage is :
1. if c2 + r ≤ a+ p :
– if x ≤ Y , then Q∗(a, p, Y ) = x, and Z = 0.
– if x > Y , then Q∗(a, p, Y ) = x, and Z∗(a, p, Y ) = x− Y .
2. if c2 + r > a+ p :
– if x ≤ Y , then Q∗(a, p, Y ) = x, and Z = 0.
– if u.x ≤ Y < x, then Q∗(a, p, Y ) = Y , and Z∗(a, p, Y ) = 0.
– if u.x > Y , then Q∗(a, p, Y ) = u.x, and Z∗(a, p, Y ) = u.x− Y .
Again, we can compute the expectation in the first stage objective function of the supplier’s model using
Proposition 2. We obtain the following theorem :
Theorem 2
In the Stackelberg game, the supplier’s optimal first stage decision Y ∗ is equal to :
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1. if c2 + r ≤ a+ p,
Y ∗ = F−1(
c2 − c1
c2 − a )
2. if c2 + r > a+ p, the solution of the following equation :




To conclude this section, we express the expectation of the optimal values of the supplier’s second stage
decision variables. We need these expressions to compute the optimal contract for the retailer. In fact, Theorem
2 will be used to compute the response Y ∗(a, p) of the supplier to a contract (a, p) and this response will be
used to compute the different costs ( capacity installed, quantity of items delivered) of the retailer.
Proposition 3
1. If c2 + r ≤ a+ p, then we have :
Z∗ = E [x] +
∫ Y ∗
0
F (x)dx− Y ∗
Q∗ = E [x]
2. If c2 + r > a+ p, then we have :




F (x)dx)− Y ∗








Using Proposition 3, we are now able to rewrite the retailer’s model as two different non-linear programs :




s.t (p− r).E [x] + a.(E [x] +
∫ Y ∗
0
F (x)dx)− c2.(E [x] +
∫ Y ∗
0
F (x)dx− Y ∗)− c1.Y ∗ ≥ 0 (8)
Y ∗ = F−1(
c2 − c1
c2 − a ) (9)
a+ p ≥ c2 + r (10)
a, p ≥ 0
and











































− c1.Y ∗ ≥ 0 (11)
c2 − c1 − (p− r).F (Y ∗) + (p− r + a− c2).F (Y
∗
u
) = 0 (12)
a+ p < c2 + r (13)
a, p ≥ 0
Where constraints (8) and ??11) represent the supplier’s reservation profit. Constraints (9) and (11) are used
to define the optimal value of Y ∗, and constraints (13) and (12) are used to determine which case is currently
considered.
5
Both these model can be solved with a general NLP solver. Once it is done, compare the two optimal solution,
the one with the highest value is the optimal solution of the retailer’s problem.
6. Numerical study
In this section, we provide numerical examples to compare the performance of different system structures,
to attain qualitative insights into their sensitivity with respect to several parameters, and to investigate the
applicability of the proposed contract.
We consider the following basic system parameters : µ = 5000, σ = 500, m = 40, c1 = 200,
c2 = 400, s = 30, b = 10, r = 5 and u = 0.9. All the tests were performed using MATLAB (R2007b) on a
machine with an intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU (3.70 GHz) with 8,00 GB of installed memory. For each scenario
tested, we made a numerical search to find the optimal values of a∗, p∗ and Y ∗(a∗, p∗). Due the large number
of parameters, we restrict our analyzis to tests on parameters of the same gender. The tests performed are on
variations of the requisition cost (c2), of the shortage cost (b) and on variations of the variability of the demand
and on the capacity of trucks (σ and m). We do not analyze the reaction of our algorithm to a change in the
mean µ of the demand because this is done in the tests analyzing the variation of m (a system where µ = 5000
and m = 10 is the same as a system where µ = 10000 and m = 20).
The effects of demand variability and of the truck capacity
In the first battery of tests, we investigate how the system reacts to modifications of σ and m. The range of
the tested parameters, σ and m, are respectively {100, 500, 1000, 1500} and {20, 40, 60, 80, 100}. Table 1 shows
the obtained results. Here are some basic observations from Table 1 :
OBS 1. As expected, the contract proposed does not coordinate the supply chain but obtain good results (the
ratio between the profit of the decentralized system over the centralized system is generally over 0.9).
OBS 2. The retailer captures nearly all the profits of the supply chain. The retailer only propose contracts
of the second type, i.e such that a+ p.m < c2 + r.m.
A remark on the contract : the retailer propose a fee per truck used as close as possible of c1 and a very small
price per unit transported. This indicates that, under the chosen settings, the retailer prefers to avoid shortages
than over capacity.
OBS 3. In both cases, the total profit decreases with the variability but increases with the trucks capacity.
This observation can be described as obvious. With a higher truck capacity, the cost per unit transported, c1m +r
in first period and c2m + r in second, decreased so the total profit increases. Due to the contract, if the variability
of the demand is high, the supplier will request a high number of trucks in first period so as to avoid shortages.
OBS 4. The contract proposed by the retailer is less attractive for the supplier when the truck capacity is
high and when the variability of demand is low.
The cases with a high truck capacity or a low variability of demand can be described as more profitable for the
supplier. Due to the hypothesis on the contract : a < c1 and p ≥ r, the supplier is able to make more profit
when the truck capacity is high. Indeed, as the supplier gains money on the unit that he transports and loses
money on the trucks that he uses, if he is able to sent more unit with the same amount of trucks, he obtains
better profits. As for the variability, if it is low, the supplier takes less risks of shortages and over capacity, wich
increases its profits. As a consequence, the supplier will accept less profitable contracts in these cases.
The effects of shortage and requisition costs
The second battery of tests investigates the effects of the costs c2 and b on both systems. The tested range of
c2 and of b are {300, 400, 800, 1200} and {0, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10} respectively. The results are shown in Table 2. Here
are some basic observations from Table 2 :
OBS 5. Variations of both b and c2 have small impact on the supplier’s decision and on the retailer’s profit.
As explained before, the retailer proposes a contract such that the risks of shortages are minimized. As a
consequence, modification of costs parameters that relates to possible shortages : b if it is too costly for the
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Table 1 – Optimal solutions for a range of values of σ and m
Profit comparisons Optimal decisions comparisons
m Πcent ΠR ΠC Y
∗
cent Y
∗(a∗, p∗) a∗ p∗
σ = 100
20 74200 66490 5800 250 245 199 6.25
40 99600 94380 3580 125 124 199 5.75
60 108070 103950 2880 83.3 83 199 5.6
80 112300 108830 2440 62.5 65 199 5.5
100 114800 111820 1950 50 51 199 5.4
σ =500
20 71000 69000 20 250 254 199 5.1
40 98000 94630 250 125 127 199 5.1
60 107000 103170 340 83.3 85 199 5.1
80 111500 107440 100 62.5 63 199 5.05
100 114200 110060 900 50 52 199 5.2
σ =1000
20 67000 64340 280 250 283 199 5.2
40 96000 93090 130 125 141 199 5.1
60 105670 102960 250 83.3 94 199 5.1
80 110500 107490 80 62.5 71 199 5.05
100 113400 110370 110 50 57 199 5.05
σ =1500
20 63000 58530 560 250 312 199 5.3
40 94000 93090 530 125 156 199 5.2
60 105350 101200 190 83.3 104 199 5.1
80 109500 106550 260 62.5 78 199 5.1
100 112600 109750 50 50 62 199 5.05
supplier to requisition additional trucks and c2 in the other case, have a small impact on the decentralized
system.
7. Conclusion and future research
This paper studies the problem of coordination in a two-level supply chain with stochastic demand. We in-
vestigate the system under both centralized and decentralized decision-making situations. We propose a contract
based on two simple observations : the number of trucks used and the number of transported items. At first
glance, it seems that the proposed model is simple to solve, but after careful examination of the structure of
the developed game, the optimal values of the contract parameters are obtained using nonlinear optimization
problems.
Numerical analysis were conducted to study the effects of capacity, variability of demand, shortages and
requisition costs. The results show that even if the proposed contract does not coordinate the supply chain, it
performs reasonnably well. It is worthwhile to indicate that the retailer generally captures all the profits because
he is the leader and has opportunity to act the first.
An interesting direction for future research is to study the problem under a cooperative game theory ap-
proach, where all the parties first try to coordinate the suply chain and then decide of how to allocate the total
profits. An possible extension to the system studied is to consider the case where the retailer has full information
about the demand distribution function and not the supplier and vice-versa. Consequently, the retailer may lie
to the supplier to obtain a greater capacity at least cost. Moreover, the game could also imply different suppliers
with different cost structures which compete for the contract proposed by the retailer. Considering a minimum
load constraint per truck is another extension.
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Table 2 – Optimal solutions for a range of values of c2 and b
Profit comparisons Optimal decisions comparisons
b Πcent ΠR ΠC Y
∗
cent Y
∗(a∗, p∗) a∗ p∗
c2 = 300
0 98630 95860 60 119 127 199 5.05
2.5 98630 95550 60 119 127 199 5.05
5 98630 95250 60 119 127 199 5.05
7.5 98630 94950 60 119 127 199 5.05
10 98630 94650 60 119 127 199 5.05
c2 =400
0 98000 95820 60 125 127 199 5.06
2.5 98000 95520 60 125 127 199 5.06
5 98000 95220 60 125 127 199 5.06
7.5 98000 94930 60 125 127 199 5.06
10 98000 94430 60 125 127 199 5.06
c2 =800
0 96800 95600 45 133 127 199 5.1
2.5 96800 95310 45 133 127 199 5.1
5 96800 95000 45 133 127 199 5.1
7.5 96800 94730 45 133 127 199 5.1
10 96800 94430 45 133 127 199 5.1
c2 =1200
0 96680 95370 80 136 127 199 5.15
2.5 96360 95080 80 136 127 199 5.15
5 96200 94790 80 137 127 199 5.15
7.5 96200 94500 80 137 127 199 5.15
10 96200 94200 80 137 127 199 5.15
8. Appendices
Proof of Proposition 1
We analyze each case separately. In the first case, requisitioning additional capacity is profitable whenever
the initial capacity is insufficient. As a consequence, the demand will always be satisfied and the quantity
delivered, Q, will always be equal to x. If the capacity reserved is sufficient, i.e Y ≥ x, then there is no need for
additional trucks : Z = 0. Otherwhise, the additional capacity requested is equal to the difference between the
demand and the initial capacity : Z = x−Y . It is not profitable to request more because the system would pay
for useless capacity.
In the second case, the decision maker will not iuse the emergency option unless obligated. As a consequence,
when the initial capacity is sufficient to satisfy at least the minimum requirements, i.e m.Y ≥ u/x, then Z = 0.
Otherwhise, the additional capacity requested is equal to the difference between the minimum requirement and
the initial capacity : Z = u.x− Y .
Proof of Theorem 1
Using Proposition 1, we analyse the profit function, Πcent(Y ), for each case :
– If s ≥ c2 + r, then :






[(s− r).x− c2.(x− Y )] .f(x)dx








This function is a sum of concave functions so it is concave. As a consequence, we can use the first order
condition, and obtain :
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Y ∗ = F−1( c2−c1c2 ).
– If s < c2 + r, then :












[(s− r).u.x− c2.(u.x− Y )]





























= (c2 − c1).Y − (s− r).
∫ Y
0




F (x)dx+ E [x]
]
Again this function is the sum of concave functions so we can use the first order conditions. We obtain
that Y ∗ is the solution to the following equation :
c2 − c1 − (s− r).F (Y ) + [s− r − c2] .F (Yu ).
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to the proof of proposition 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
Using Proposition 2, we analyse the profit function, Π(Y ), for each case :
– If c2 + r ≤ a+ p, then :
Π(Y ) = −c1.Y +
∫ Y
0
[(p− r).x+ a.Y ] .f(x)dx+
∫ +∞
Y
[(p− r).x+ a.x− c2.(x− Y )] .f(x)dx








This function is a sum of concave functions so it is concave. As a consequence, we can use the first order
condition, and obtain :
Y ∗ = F−1( c2−c1c2−a ).
– If c2 + r.m < a+ p.m, then :
Π(Y ) = −c1.Y +
∫ Y
0









[(p− r).u.x+ a.u.x− c2.(u.x− Y )] .f(x)dx







+(p− r + a).Y.(F (Y
u
)− F (Y )) + c2.Y.(1− F (Y
u
))













= (c2 − c1).Y − (p− r).
∫ Y
0








Again this function is the sum of concave functions so we can use the first order conditions. We obtain
that Y ∗ is the solution to the following equation :
c2 − c1 − (p− r).F (Y ) + [(p− r) + a− c2] .F (Yu ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3

















= E [x]− Y.F (Y ) +
∫ Y
0
F (x)dx− Y (1− F (Y ))

















= Y.F (Y )−
∫ Y
0
F (x)dx+ Y.(F (
Y
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